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Abstract
Indirect reciprocity is one of the basic mechanisms to sustain mutual cooperation.
Beneficial acts are returned, not by the recipient, but by third parties. Indirect reci-
procity is based on reputation and status: it pays to provide help because this makes
one more likely to receive help in turn. The mechanism depends on knowing the past
behavior of other players, and assessing that behavior. There are many diﬀerent systems
of assessing other individuals, which can be interpreted as rudimentary moral systems
(i.e. views on what is ’good’ or ’bad’). In this paper, we describe the competition of
some of the leading assessment rules called SUGDEN and KANDORI by analytic meth-
ods. We show that the sterner rule KANDORI has a slight advantage in the sense that
KANDORI-players have more chance to earn higher payoﬀ than SUGDEN-players in the
presence of unconditional altruists. On the other hand, we see that the unconditional
altruists are eliminated in the long run and that stable polymorphisms of KANDORI
and SUGDEN can subsist, but that a moral consensus is realized even in those poly-
morphic states: all players’ images are the same in each observer’s eyes.
Keywords: Replicator Dynamics; Prisoner’s Dilemma Game; Leading Eight; Second-order
Assessment
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1 Introduction
In indirect reciprocity, helpful acts are returned, not by the recipient, but by third parties
(Alexander, 1987; Sugden, 1986; Trivers, 1971). If Alice helps Betty, then Alice is helped
in turn, not by Betty, as in direct reciprocation, but by some Conny or Claire. Indirect
reciprocity has been amply documented in human populations (Camerer and Fehr, 2006;
Bolton et al., 2005; Seinen and Schram, 2001; Wedekind and Milinski, 2000; Wedekind and
Braithwaite, 2002). In order not to be subverted by exploiters (for instance by defectors who
never help others), the help must be channelled away from them, and directed preferentially
towards the helpers. For this, two requirements are needed: (a) information about previous
interactions, even those in which one has not been involved; and (b) an assessment of these
interactions. Thus indirect reciprocity is based on constant monitoring of the other members
of the population, and on judging whether they deserve to be helped or not, or in other
words whether they have a good image or not (Leimar and Hammerstein, 2001; Nowak and
Sigmund, 1998a, b; Panchanathan and Boyd, 2003). This can be viewed as an elementary
form of moral judgment. Individuals assess other players’ actions as good or bad even if they
are not directly aﬀected by them.
The most elementary way for C to assess A simply reflects whether A gave help to B or
not. In the first case, A is viewed as good and in the second case as bad. But this leads to
an interesting inconsistency: if C refuses to help A, then C is perceived by third parties as
bad irrespective of whether the potential recipient A is good or bad. As a result, C is less
likely to be helped. Acting on a moral judgment can thus be costly. This suggests that a
better assessment rule should also take into account whether a refusal to help was justified
or not (see Camerer and Fehr (2006), Leimar and Hammerstein (2001), Nowak and Sigmund
(1998a) and Sugden (1986)). However, there exist several ways for doing this, and it is not
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clear which assessment should evolve in the long term. To give an example: should the act
of helping a bad individual be considered as good or as bad?
There are many possible moral systems. How do they compare? In a first approach,
we may consider three diﬀerent classes of assessment rules (Brandt and Sigmund, 2004). A
first-order assessment rule only takes into account whether A helps B or not. A second-
order assessment rule takes also into account the image of the recipient B. A third-order
assessment rule takes moreover into account the image of the donor A. A strategy in the
indirect reciprocity interaction consists of an assessment rule together with an action rule
telling the player which decision to take, as a donor, depending on the image of the recipient
and the own image (Brandt and Sigmund, 2004; Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004).
Ohtsuki and Iwasa have shown that among the 4096 resulting strategies, only 8 lead to a
stable regime of mutual cooperation, if adopted by all members of the population. These are
said to be the leading eight (Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004, 2006). Two of these strategies are based
on second-order assessment, none on first-order assessment. In this context, ’stable’ means
that the corresponding population cannot be invaded by other action rules. However, this
does not settle the issue whether other assessment rules can invade. In the set-up considered
by Ohtsuki and Iwasa, the image of an individual is the same in the eyes of all members of
the population. Clearly, this does not allow to compare diﬀerent assessment rules.
If one wants to analyze the evolution of even the simplest system of morals, one has
to consider the competition of several assessment rules in the population. This is what
we propose to do in the present paper: we consider the two second-order assessment rules
belonging to the ’leading eight’, as well as the first-order assessment rule which only registers
whether help is given or not. We find that this first-order assessment rule is eliminated (not
surprisingly), and that among the second-order assessment rules, the sterner rule has a slight
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advantage; if it is as frequent as the other rule (or more frequent), its payoﬀ is at least as
high. Stable polymorphisms of the two second-order assessment rules exist, but interestingly,
the population always converges to a state where both assessments coincide: evolution leads
to moral consensus.
In the following sections, we describe the model, derive the results, and discuss both
outcomes and methods.
2 The model
We consider a large, well-mixed population. From time to time, two individuals are randomly
matched in a one-shot interaction, a so-called donation game. A coin toss decides who is the
potential donor and the potential recipient (we suppress the ’potential’ from now on). The
donor can, at a personal cost c, provide a benefit b to the recipient, with b > c. We shall
actually assume (as is usually done) that both players are simultaneously donor and recipient:
this does not aﬀect the outcome of the model. The interaction is an example of a Prisoner’s
Dilemma game. We assume that each individual experiences an infinity of such interactions,
always with diﬀerent partners.
Furthermore, we assume that the players can observe each other. (If not, cooperation
cannot evolve.) Each player A has an assessment rule by which to judge others according
to their behavior as donor in their previous interaction. Player A’s judgment is binary: it
assigns either γ (for ’good’) or β (for ’bad’) to all other players. The action rules of all players
are the same: they give help if they assess the recipient as γ, and they refuse help otherwise.
(In technical terms, all action rules are of Co-type, see Brandt and Sigmund (2004)). The
assessment rules, however, can be diﬀerent. The corresponding strategies, therefore, depend
5
entirely on the assessment rule. We shall consider only the following assessment rules (see also
Table1 and Fig.1): (1) AllC (view everyone as γ); (2) AllD (view everyone as β); (3) SUGDEN,
also known as Simple Standing (view everyone as γ except those who, in their previous round,
refused help to a γ-recipient); (4) KANDORI (view exactly those as γ who, in their previous
round, gave help to a γ-recipient or refused help to a β-recipient); and finally (5) SCORING
(the first-order assessment that views exactly those as γ who, in their previous round, gave
help, no matter to whom). We see that the second-order assessment rules SUGDEN and
KANDORI diﬀer in their view of those who give help to a β-player: KANDORI, the sterner
assessment, condemns this.
We shall moreover assume that players sometimes commit an error. With a certain proba-
bility ǫ, they fail to implement an intended help. Following Leimar and Hammerstein (2001),
Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2004, 2006) and Panchanathan and Boyd (2003), we assume that an
intended refusal is always carried out (see also Fishman et al. (2001), Fishman (2003) and
Lotem et al. (1999)). Finally, we assume that from time to time, a randomly chosen individual
switches strategy by adopting the strategy i of a model chosen with a probability proportional
to that model’s fitness Fi = (1 − s)F + sPi. Here, F is a baseline fitness (the same for all),
Pi is the average payoﬀ for an individual of type i, and s ∈]0, 1] is a parameter measuring the
importance of the game for overall success. The resulting dynamics is given (up to a change
in velocity) by the replicator equation x˙i = xi(Pi − P¯ ), where xi is the frequency of strategy
i in the population and P¯ =
∑
k xkPk is the average payoﬀ in the population (see Hofbauer
and Sigmund (1998) p. 87).
Ohtsuki and Iwasa showed that SUGDEN and KANDORI belong to the leading eight: if
everyone in the population shares the corresponding assessment rule, it is best to follow the
corresponding action module of giving help exactly to the γ-recipients (Ohtsuki and Iwasa,
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2004). No other action module (such as, for instance: ’always refuse help’, or ’help only if, in
addition, the own image is β’) can invade. But this does not settle the issue of the assessment
rule itself. Is there a selective advantage in choosing one rule rather than another? For this,
we have to assume that any given player A can have diﬀerent images in the eyes of diﬀerent
observers. All individuals form their own opinion on the interactions they observe. This
approach is not used by Ohtsuki and Iwasa, who assume that the image is public (decided,
for instance, by one observer who acts as a referee). Private images are used in the individual-
based simulations in Brandt and Sigmund (2004) and Pacheco et al. (2006). Here, we present
an analytical approach to deal with the competition of several assessment rules.
Let us first consider the competition of SUGDEN and KANDORI only. We allow for
AllC and AllD players in the population, but not for SCORING. Thus we consider only the
strategies (1) to (4). We denote γ as ’good’ respectively ’nice’ in the eyes of an SUGDEN-
resp. KANDORI-player, and β as ’bad’ resp. ’nasty’. We denote the proportions of players
of type i who are evaluated as (a) both bad and nasty by ri
00
, (b) bad and nice by ri
01
, (c)
good and nasty by ri
10
and (d) good and nice by ri
11
(= 1− ri
00
− ri
01
− ri
10
).
These quantities determine the payoﬀs. In fact, if we define
ri = r
i
10
+ ri
11
(prop. of good players of type i), (1)
si = r
i
01
+ ri
11
(prop. of nice players of type i), (2)
the payoﬀs Pi are expressed by
P1 = −ǫ¯c+ ǫ¯(x1 + r1x3 + s1x4)b, (3)
P2 = ǫ¯(x1 + r2x3 + s2x4)b, (4)
P3 = −ǫ¯
∑
i xiric+ ǫ¯(x1 + r3x3 + s3x4)b, (5)
P4 = −ǫ¯
∑
i xisic+ ǫ¯(x1 + r4x3 + s4x4)b, (6)
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where ǫ¯ := 1 − ǫ is the probability that an intended help is actually given. For example,
ǫ¯
∑
i xisi in Eq.(6) is the probability that a player of type 4 gives a help to another player,
and thus incurs cost c. The term ǫ¯(x1 + r4x3 + s4x4) is the probability that a player of type 4
is helped by a randomly chosen donor, and thus provided with a benefit b.
In general, rimn changes in time, but such changes must be much faster than the changes
of the frequencies of strategies xi. Therefore we ignore the transient of the evolution of r
i
mn
and only consider the equilibrium after many rounds of games with xi being fixed. At the
equilibrium, rimn satisfies the following equality:
rimn = (the probability that i actually helps
and the action is evaluated as m resp. n)
+ (the probability that i defects erroneously
and the action is evaluated as m resp. n)
+ (the probability that i defects intentionally
and the action is evaluated as m resp. n). (7)
These probabilities can be expressed by the proportions of (m,n)-players in the whole popu-
lation, namely P,Q,R and S:
P =
∑
i
xir
i
00
(prop. of bad-nasty players), (8)
Q =
∑
i
xir
i
01
(prop. of bad-nice players), (9)
R =
∑
i
xir
i
10
(prop. of good-nasty players), (10)
S =
∑
i
xir
i
11
(prop. of good-nice players). (11)
We note that R+S is the proportion of good players, Q+S that of nice players, Q+P that
of bad players and R+ P the proportion of nasty players.
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This yields the following relations between rimn and P,Q,R (and S = 1− P −Q− R):


r1
11
= ǫ¯(Q+ S) + ǫP r1
10
= ǫ¯(R + P ) + ǫQ
r1
01
= ǫR r1
00
= ǫS
r2
11
= P r2
10
= Q
r2
01
= R r2
00
= S
r3
11
= ǫ¯S + P r3
10
= ǫ¯R+Q
r3
01
= ǫR r3
00
= ǫS
r4
11
= ǫ¯(Q+ S) + P r4
10
= ǫQ
r4
01
= R r4
00
= ǫS


. (12)
How these equations are obtained is presented in the supplementary material.
If we substitute these relations into Eqs.(8), (9) and (10), we obtain a linear system for
the unknowns P,Q,R:
c11P + c12Q+ c13R = d1, (13)
c21P + c22Q+ c23R = d2, (14)
c31P + c32Q+ c33R = d3, (15)
with d1 = ǫ(x1 + x3 + x4) + x2, d2 = d3 = 0 and


c11 = d1 + 1 c12 = d1 c13 = d1
c21 = 0 c22 = 1 c23 = −d1 − ǫ¯x4
c31 = −ǫ¯x1 c32 = −d1 − ǫ¯x3 c33 = 1− ǫ¯(x1 + x3)


. (16)
By solving, we obtain the payoﬀ values as functions of the frequencies (x1, x2, x3, x4) of
the strategies.
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3 Results
The determinant of the matrix (cij) is zero only on the edge between AllD and SUGDEN
(i.e., if x1 = x4 = 0). The dynamics on that edge is bistable, with the unstable fixed point
determined by x3 = c/ǫ¯b, see also Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2007).
From Eqs.(13)-(16), it follows that, in the presence of the unconditional altruists (i.e., if
x1 > 0),
Q < R, Q < P < S (17)
and
r2 < s1 < s3 < r4 < r1 = r3 < s4 (18)
are always valid (see Appendix A for the detailed calculation). The proportion of nice AllD-
players s2 is somewhere between r2 and r1 = r3. From these inequalities, we see that the
condition x3 ≤ x4 implies P3 < P4 (see Appendix A). Thus if KANDORI and SUGDEN are
equally frequent, the former wins whenever unconditional altruists are present.
The advantage of KANDORI can be understood by the following argument: in order that
a cooperative player A obtains a nice image from KANDORI, A’s recipient must also be
nice, whereas A always obtains a good evaluation from SUGDEN. Therefore a cooperative
player who is nice is always good, whereas the inverse is not necessarily true; thus it is
more diﬃcult to obtain nice images than good ones. The inequality Q < R implies that
KANDORI-players incur less cost than SUGDEN-players on average if AllC is present. At
the same time, the inequality s3 < r4 implies that the probability that KANDORI-players
evaluate SUGDEN-players as nice is less than that SUGDEN-players evaluate KANDORI-
players as good. Therefore, KANDORI-players are more likely to obtain a cooperative oﬀer
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from SUGDEN-players than vice-versa. Moreover, we find from s3 < r4 < r3 < s4 that
KANDORI-players are more likely to give help to KANDORI-players and less likely to give
help to SUGDEN-players. If the two types of discriminators are equally frequent, KANDORI
obtains a higher payoﬀ than SUGDEN and its relative frequency increases.
The second result obtained from the inequalities is that P3 is greater than P1 if x1 > 0.
Indeed, using P¯i := Pi/ǫ¯, we see that
P¯3 − P¯1 =
(
(r3 − r1)x3 + (s3 − s1)x4
)
b+ (1−
∑
i
xiri)c > 0. (19)
Hence x1/x3 converges to 0, so that all orbits in the interior of the state simplex converge to
the face x1 = 0, i.e., AllC is eliminated in the long run.
If x1 = 0 then c31 = 0, hence Eqs. (14) and (15) imply Q = R = 0. This means that in
the absence of AllC-players, SUGDEN and KANDORI always agree in their assessment and
hence do not diﬀer in their behavior. In this case,
P =
1− ǫ¯(x3 + x4)
2− ǫ¯(x3 + x4)
, (20)
S =
1
2− ǫ¯(x3 + x4)
. (21)
On the face x1 = 0, P3 = P4 and hence x3/x4 is constant (Fig.2-(c)). Each solution remains
on a half ray through x2 = 1; it is easy to see that the segment with x3 + x4 = c/ǫ¯b consists
of fixed points. Depending on which side of that segment they start, orbits converge either
to x2 = 1 or x2 = 0. Hence the evolution, in the absence of AllC, leads either to AllD or else
to a stable mixture of KANDORI and SUGDEN. These states are the only Nash equilibria.
To describe the competition of SCORING with one of the second-order assessment rules
(for instance, KANDORI), we can use equations up to Eq.(11), replacing the other assessment
rule with SCORING. Fig. 3-(a) shows the vector field of the replicator dynamics if SCORING
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and KANDORI are present in the population. The equations used in this simulation are given
in the supplementary material. A homogeneous population of SCORING is unstable, as AllC
and KANDORI can invade. The edge AllD-SCORING consists of fixed points. But the stable
ones are only those with x3 ≤ c/ǫ¯b. At these stable fixed points, all players defect and their
payoﬀ is zero. These fixed points cannot be invaded by KANDORI or AllC and hence are
Nash equilibria (Fig.3-(c)).
The segment given by x3 = c/ǫ¯b and x4 = 0 also consists of fixed points. However, these
are unstable since these states can be invaded by KANDORI, see Fig.3-(b).
The same holds for the competition of SCORING with SUGDEN.
If all 5 types of strategies are present, AllC is again eliminated in the long run. If x1 = 0,
the replicator dynamics leads either to a mixture of AllD and SCORING (with the frequency
of defectors at least 1− c/ǫ¯b), or to a mixture of KANDORI and SUGDEN (see Fig.4). The
two types of players agree in their assessment (in the former case, all are evaluated as β, thus
all defect, in the latter case, the assessment of SUGDEN and KANDORI are equivalent as
mentioned above), and moral consensus is achieved.
4 Discussion
There are several other papers highlighting the merits of KANDORI. We mention, in partic-
ular, Chalub et al. (2006) and Pacheco et al. (2006), which apply numerical simulations to a
group selection scenario. We also refer to Brandt and Sigmund (2004), where two third-order
rules called STANDING and JUDGING are compared (which are closely related to SUGDEN
and KANDORI respectively). It is shown that the sterner rule JUDGING has advantages
compared to the milder rule STANDING, based on individual-based simulations in group
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structured populations.
Our paper relies entirely on analytic methods and uses an individual selection scenario. We
extend the investigations of Ohtsuki and Iwasa in one direction, by allowing diﬀerent players
to judge their co-players by diﬀerent assessment rules. This is an important issue, as it allows
to investigate the competition of diﬀerent ’moral systems’. In particular, this approach no
longer makes use of the assumption that one player acts as a referee whose public assessment
is adopted by all other players (Ohtsuki and Iwasa, 2004; Pacheco et al., 2006; Panchanathan
and Boyd, 2003). It is common-day experience that diﬀerent people can assess one and the
same action in diﬀerent ways. While gossip can greatly help to spread information, it need
not lead to consensual assessment (Sommerfeld et al., 2007).
Just as in Ohtsuki and Iwasa (2007), we have not considered third-order assessment rules.
The complications of an analytical treatment of such rules seem too arduous at present.
We have made another departure from the model by Ohtsuki and Iwasa, which concerns a
technical point. In their model, generations are separate: all players are born at the same time
and their rounds are synchronized. We assume that the strategies spread by imitation, rather
than by inheritance. Instead of producing oﬀspring, players switch their strategy. This does
not aﬀect the mathematical model, but makes the interpretation somewhat more natural.
Moreover, we assume asynchronous updating: players update their strategy one at a time,
and their rounds are not synchronized. This modeling assumption, however, has hardly any
eﬀect on the outcome. One interesting issue is to investigate the eﬀects of a random number of
rounds and analyze whether the probability of a further round smaller than one qualitatively
changes the results obtained here (see Brandt and Sigmund (2006)).
Both our model and that of Ohtsuki and Iwasa suﬀer from two limitations which are
more serious. One concerns the assumption that players are assessed according to their last
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interaction only: their actions in previous rounds are not taken into account. In reality,
reputations are often based on a longer data-base. Moreover, they are not ’binary’: the
moral world is not just black or white. The second limitation is due to the assumption
that players have perfect information. Again, this is unrealistic. Usually, players often have
only limited information, and sometimes none at all (Mohtashemi and Mui, 2003; Nowak
and Sigmund, 1998b). If they do not know the antecedents of their co-player, they need
a ’default’ rule. Since this rule describes whether the individual is trustful or suspicious,
this clearly introduces an important distinction. We were not able yet to overcome the
complications raised by this possibility. Moreover, an assessment can be erroneous. Again, this
is a possibility which we encounter every day. Misunderstandings and mis-perceptions have
possibly a more devastating eﬀect than mis-implementations (see Takahashi and Mashima
(2006) on the role of errors in perception). Exchange of information and opinions via gossip
and other forms of communication is important, but not faultless (Sommerfeld et al., 2007;
Takahashi and Mashima, 2006).
If we admit that players can mis-perceive whether help has been given or refused, or
that they can be confused about the reputation of the recipient, we introduce a source of
errors which is extremely complicated to analyze. It seems not unlikely that these errors
aﬀect the more complex second-order assessment rules, such as SUGDEN and KANDORI,
to a greater degree than the more simple-minded first-order SCORING. In fact, there is
experimental evidence to support the view that second-order assessment can overtax human
cognitive abilities (Milinski et al., 2001). We know no empirical work permitting to conclude
whether SUGDEN or KANDORI is more frequent.
Indirect reciprocity based on reputation systems has a long history (Ellison, 1994; Kan-
dori, 1992; Okuno-Fujiwara and Postlewaite, 1995; Pollock and Dugatkin, 1992; Rosenthal,
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1979; Yamagishi et al., 1999). As mentioned in Nowak and Sigmund (2005), there are two
main motivations to pursue its investigation. One concerns the evolution of human commu-
nities: how does cooperation work in villages and small-scale societies? (See Dufwenberg et
al. (2001), Masuda and Ohtsuki (2007), Milinski et al. (2002a, b), Panchanathan and Boyd
(2004), Roberts (2008), Semmann et al. (2004) and Suzuki and Akiyama (2007a, b)). Re-
cently, evidence for indirect reciprocation in other species has also been uncovered (Bshary
and Grutter, 2006). The other motivation concerns the rapid growth of anonymous interac-
tions on a global scale, made possible by the spread of communication networks: how can
cheating be avoided in on-line trading? (see Bolton et al. (2004) and Keser (2002)) In both
cases, simple, robust methods for assessing others are essential.
The present investigation can clearly be no more than a first step in analyzing the com-
petition of diﬀerent rudimentary forms of moral systems. Within the context of second-order
assessment rules belonging to the leading eight, the sterner rule has an advantage (see also
Chalub et al. (2006) and Pacheco et al. (2006)), but evolution converges to a state where
both rules can coexist and always agree.
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Appendix A Inequalities
We mention some inequalities that help us understand the system better. Let us assume
x1 > 0, x3 > 0 and x4 > 0. From Eq.(13) together with P +Q+ R = 1− S, we immediately
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find P = d1S < S. From Eq.(14) we have Q = −c23R < R. This relation between R
and Q together with Eq.(15) yields a relation c31P + c32Q − c33/c23Q = 0 that is simplified
to Q = c31c23/(c33 − c32c23)P . Here c31c23 = ǫ¯
(
1 − ǫ¯(x1 + x3)
)
x1 ≥ 0 and c33 − c32c23 =
ǫ¯
(
1− ǫ¯(x1 + x3)
)
(x1 + x4) = c31c23 + ǫ¯
(
1− ǫ¯(x1 + x3)
)
x4 > c31c23. Hence Q < P .
From these inequalities, Eq.(18) is derived. In fact from Eq.(12), s4 − r1 = ǫ(R−Q) > 0,
r1 − r3 = 0 and r1 − r4 = ǫ¯R > 0. The diﬀerence between r4 and s3 is calculated as
r4 − s3 = Q − ǫR. Substituting Q = −c23R from Eq.(14), we have r4 − s3 = (−c23 − ǫ)R,
where −c23 − ǫ = ǫ(x1 + x3) + (x2 + x4) − ǫ(x1 + x2 + x3 + x4) = ǫ¯(x2 + x4) > 0. Further,
s3 − s1 = ǫ¯(P −Q) > 0 and s1 − r2 = ǫ¯(S − P ) + ǫ(R−Q) > 0.
We can also find an explicit expression for the region P3 = P4, using
P¯4 − P¯3 = Cˆc+ Bˆb, (A.1)
where Cˆ is the cost term
∑
i(ri − si)xi and Bˆ the benefit term (r4 − r3)x3 + (s4 − s3)x4. By
the definitions of ri and si, we have
Cˆ = R −Q > 0,
Bˆ = −ǫ¯Rx3 + ǫ¯(Q+R)x4. (A.2)
Taking the relation between R and Q into account, we obtain
Cˆ = ǫ¯(1 + c23)R = ǫ¯(x1 + x3)R,
Bˆ = −ǫ¯x3R+ ǫ¯x4(1− c23)R
= ǫ¯
(
−x3 + x4(2− ǫ¯x1 − ǫ¯x3)
)
R. (A.3)
Therefore if −x3 + x4(2 − ǫ¯x1 − ǫ¯x3) ≤ 0 or equivalently x4 ≤ x3/(2 − ǫ¯x1 − ǫ¯x3), P4 > P3
holds regardless of the values of b and c. This region completely includes the plane x3 = x4
in the state space.
16
P4 is larger than P3 if
c(x1 + x3)− x3b+ (2− ǫ¯x3 − ǫ¯x1)x4b > 0, (A.4)
which depends on the benefit-cost ratio c/b. In particular, for x2 = 0, i.e., if AllD is absent,
this region is given by x3 < c/b(1− x4) + (2− ǫ¯+ ǫ¯x4)x4.
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Table 1: Definitions of the five assessment rules studied in this paper
Situation AllC AllD SUGDEN KANDORI SCORING
Give help to γ-recipient γ β γ γ γ
Give help to β-recipient γ β γ β γ
Refuse help to γ-recipient γ β β β β
Refuse help to β-recipient γ β γ γ β
22
Figure 1: The situations that are positively assessed by the second-order assessment rules
in the leading eight (top: SUGDEN-observer, bottom: KANDORI-observer). All the other
situations will be negatively assessed. The positive (or negative) assessment corresponds to γ
(or β) in the main text. To distinguish the two rules, the positive (or negative) assessment is
denoted by good (or bad) in the eyes of the SUGDEN-observer and by nice (or nasty) in the
eyes of the KANDORI-observer. The symbol “**” in the top left figure is an abbreviation for
“good or bad”.
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Figure 2: The vector field generated by replicator dynamics in the whole state space (a) and
on each face (b-d). The vector field on the face x4 = 0 is similar to (d) (see also (Ohtsuki
and Iwasa, 2007)). The abbreviation S corresponds to SUGDEN and K to KANDORI. To
produce the figure, we normalized the vector at each point (except for the case where the
vector vanishes) so that the direction is easily recognized. Parameters: c = 1, b = 3 and
ǫ = 0.1.
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Figure 3: Same as in Fig.2. Here the abbreviation Sco corresponds to SCORING and K to
KANDORI. The segments EF and HF consist of fixed points.
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Figure 4: The system with AllD and 3 types of discriminators. AllC is not involved. The
surface FGH given by x2 = 1−c/ǫ¯b consists of unstable fixed points, where x2 is the frequency
of AllD. Depending on which side of that surface they start from, orbits converge either to
the segment S-K or to the segment AllD-F.
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